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Times of Change - Can Turkey Make the Necessary
Changes in Its Human Rights Policies to be Admitted
to the European Union?
I. Introduction
One of the factors shaping world politics in recent times is the
question of Turkey's admission into the European Union (EU).
Turkey has petitioned the EU for membership, and the EU has
created controversy with its unwillingness to admit Turkey.'
Turkey occupies a unique position in the center of the vastly
different Western and Islamic cultures.2 While the EU has
stressed Turkey's economic and human rights problems as the
primary reasons for its refusal to admit Turkey, there are growing
concerns throughout Turkey and other Islamic countries that, in
fact, the refusal is due to anti-Muslim prejudices.3 Though other
countries have been permitted to develop their struggling
economies after admission, the EU has been adamant about
conformity to its human rights policies with regard to Turkey.4
There are a number of human rights issues that Turkey must
address before it will receive serious consideration for admission.
The human rights problem in Turkey is often linked to the
treatment of ethnic minorities, particularly the Kurds, who are
primarily located in the southeast of Turkey.5 The recent case of
Kaya v. Turkey, before the European Court of Human Rights,
exposed some of the harsh treatment of the Kurds by the Turkish
I See European Union OKs 10 for Membership, USA TODAY, Oct. 9, 2002, at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2002-10-09-eu-membersx.htm.
2 See id.
3 Julian Isherwood, Turkey May Seek Other Pastures, B&NNS.cOM (2002), at
http://www.euroaudio.dk/Triple-site/banns/Article-detail.asp?ID=4546.
4 See Council of Europe, The European Convention on Human Rights, at
http://www.humanrights.coe.int/intro/eng/GENERAL/ECHR.HTM (last visited Mar. 21,
2004).

5 See Special Report: Justice on Trial: State Security Courts, PoliceImpunity, and
the Intimidation of Human Rights Defenders in Turkey, 22 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 2129,
2130 (1999) [hereinafter Justice on Trial].
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government.6 In that case, a Kurdish doctor, who allegedly aided
members of the PKK (Kurdish Workers' Party), was murdered.7
Dr. Kaya's brother brought this action before the court on behalf
of his deceased brother.8 There was evidence that the doctor was
killed by contra-guerillas acting with the knowledge and support
of the state security forces.9 The fact that Mahmut Kaya was a
doctor responsible for treating demonstrators during the Kurdish
New Year's celebration" is significant in demonstrating the
political nature of the attack. It was not a random act of violence
but rather a calculated effort to deplete the will of a certain ethnic
minority.
This case, and others like it, raised the issue of governmentsponsored terrorism in Turkey, a country that already faced serious
scrutiny for its failure to adequately prosecute those responsible
for torturing others." The findings of the European Court of
Human Rights largely influence the perception that Europeans
have of what occurs within Turkish boundaries, as well as the lack
of progress the Turkish government has made in its bid to join the
EU.
This Note will explore the facts and holding of Mahmut Kaya
v. Turkey in Part II, and Part III will examine the background law
both in Turkey and the European Court of Human Rights. Part IV
will provide an analysis of the court's opinion, as well as the
possible implications of this decision. Finally, this Note will
conclude that much improvement in human rights policies remains
before Turkey will gain serious consideration for admission into
the European Union.
II. Statement of the Case
A. Relevant Facts
Dr. Hasan Kaya, the applicant's brother and victim in this
case, worked in a health center and had been accused by police of
6

See generally Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, 2000-11I Eur. Ct. H.R. 149.

7

Id. at 151.
Id. at 159.

8

9 Id. at 164.
10 Id. at 159.

11 See generally Justice on Trial, supranote 5.
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treating wounded members of the PKK (Workers' Party of
Kurdistan). 12 On February 21, 1993, Dr. Kaya received a call that
there was an injured man needing treatment. He left with Metin
Can to meet the man and never returned. 3 The bodies of Metin
Can and Hasan Kaya were found under a bridge on February 27,
1993. Both men had been shot in the head and bruises and other
injuries4 indicated that they had been tied and beaten prior to
death. '
Ahmet Kaya, the father of Hasan, petitioned the public
prosecutor with evidence that his son had been taken into custody
by police officers just prior to his disappearance, but the
prosecutor "issued a decision of non-jurisdiction ...consider[ing]
that the crime fell within the scope of the legislation on the state of
emergency."' 5 Throughout the remainder of 1993 and into 1994
there were several unconfirmed reports that non-commissioned
officers or other contra-guerrillas, paid by the state, were
responsible for the killings of Can and Kaya. 6 After media
reports stated that government employees were responsible for the
deaths of Can and Kaya, public prosecutors ordered investigations.
Addresses of the employees, however, were often unavailable, and
suspects were not found for questioning. 7
B. Relevant Law
In Kaya v. Turkey, the European Court of Human Rights held
that:
A public prosecutor who is informed by any means whatsoever
of a situation that gives rise to the suspicion that an offence has
been committed is obliged to investigate the facts in order to
decide whether or not there should be a prosecution (Article 153
of the Code of Criminal Procedure). In the case of alleged
terrorist offences, the public prosecutor is deprived of
jurisdiction in favour of a separate system of national security

12

Kaya, 2000-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 159.

13 Id.at
14

160.

Id. at 161-62.

15 Id. at 162.
16

Id.at 163.

17

Id. at 163-66.
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prosecutors and courts established throughout Turkey.18
C. Procedure
In January 1998, the Prime Minister's Office conducted an
informal investigation of criminal activities in southeast Turkey
and produced the Susurluk report, which confirmed "the existence
of unlawful dealings between political figures, government
institutions and clandestine groups."' 9 This report was presented
as evidence to the Commission along with the testimony of several
witnesses. 20 After hearing evidence from the applicant and the
government of Turkey, the Commission decided that it was unable
to determine who had killed Dr. Hasan Kaya. 2' The European
Court of Human Rights in Kaya v. Turkey found that the
Commission had done a thorough job in assessing the facts of the
case and that there was not evidence to support beyond a
reasonable doubt that State officials were responsible for the
killing of Hasan Kaya.22
It was determined by the court that Turkey had violated Article
2 (right to life), Article 3 (prohibition of torture), and Article 13
(right to an effective remedy) of the European Convention on
Human Rights. The Article 2 violation stemmed from what the
Commission determined was a "lack of effective guarantees
against unlawful conduct by State agents and defects in the
investigative procedures carried out after the killing, the State had
failed to comply with their positive obligation to protect Hasan
Kaya's right to life. 24 The applicant emphasized that several
connections between contra-guerrillas and State officials as well as
the half-hearted investigations demonstrated that the government
failed in its obligation to protect Dr. Kaya.2 ' The Turkish
government asserted that the evidence presented by the applicant
was unreliable and that there was an emergency situation in the
18 Id. at 164-65.

19 Id. at 170.
20 Id. at 167.
21

Id. at 167-70.

22

Id. at 174.

23 Id.
24

Id. at 189-90.

25

Id. at 174.
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southeast between warring factions, which the security forces were
doing their best to control.26 The court concluded, however, that
the government had failed to take appropriate measures to prevent
a very real threat of harm to Hasan Kaya and had therefore
violated Article 2.27
Regarding Article 3, the bruises and scratches on the body of
Hasan Kaya indicated that he had been tortured prior to his death,
in violation of that article. 28 The obligation imposed on countries
within the jurisdiction of the court is to protect all of its citizens
from inhuman or degrading treatment, and although the court did
not find evidence that the Turkish state caused the death of Dr.
Kaya, it did find that the government was liable for failing to
protect him.29 Because the Turkish government should have had a
reasonable expectation that Hasan Kaya was in danger, it would
also be reasonable to hold Turkey liable for the ill-treatment
suffered by Kaya.3 °
The court held that "Article 13 of the Convention guarantees
the availability at the national level of a remedy to enforce the
substance of the Convention rights and freedoms in whatever form
they might happen to be secured in the domestic legal order."31 In
other words, the contracting states must provide an "effective"
remedy to legitimate complaints.32 The court here believes that an
effective remedy would entail a thorough investigation "capable of
leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible
for the deprivation of life," and the State failed to meet that
standard in this case.33
This finding reinforced the accusation that the Turkish
government is not only indifferent to the persecution of the Kurds,
but that government officials are in fact responsible for some
aspects of that persecution. 34 Article 41 of the Convention
26

Id. at 174-75.

27

Id. at 176.

28 Id. at 181.
29

Id. at 183.

30

Id. at 184-85.

31

Id. at 184.

32

Kaya v. Turkey, 2000-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 125, 127.

33

Id. at 129.

34 See Justice on Trial, supra note 5, at 2149 ("Turkish law expressly authorizes
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provides the court with the authority to redress situations in which
individuals have suffered as a result of violations of the
Convention.35 Under Article 41, the court awarded £15,000 in
non-pecuniary damage in respect of Dr. Hasan Kaya and £2,500 in
respect of the applicant himself.36 It also awarded £22,000 for
legal costs and expenses, less 15,095 French francs received by
way of legal aid from the Council of Europe.37
D. Dissent
The dissenting judge discussed the nature of the situation in
southeast Turkey and claimed that Hasan Kaya was responsible
for protecting himself because he knew of the dangers in the
region.38 The judge claimed that it would be impossible for the
government of Turkey to protect all people similarly situated to
Dr. Kaya.39 The judge also denied that the brother of Hasan Kaya
deserved compensation for what happened to Hasan. In fact,
because Hasan was single and had no children, the judge found
that no
one was deserving of non-pecuniary damages for this
40
case.

Il. Background Law
A. Kilic v. Turkey
Kaya is not the only example of allegations of torture against
Turkey in this court. The severity of this issue is demonstrated by
the number of similar cases before the court. The case of Kilic v.
Turkey, before the European Court of Human Rights, found that
Turkey failed to protect a Kurdish journalist, despite his requests

public prosecutors to conduct investigations in the preparatory stages and to determine
jurisdiction over the case. Nevertheless, in practice, prosecutors frequently delegate both
duties to the police forces, or not uncommonly, acquiesce as security forces usurp
control over these duties.").
35 Kaya, 2000-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 129.
36 Id.
Id. at 130.
Kaya v. Turkey, App. No. 22535/93 (2000), at http:hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc
(last visited Mar. 22, 2004).
39 Kaya, 2000-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 130.
40 Id. at 129.
37

38
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for protection.4" Kemal Kilic had informed authorities that he was
being threatened and that he needed protection. 42 No protection
was provided, and Kilic was later found shot dead.43 The court
criticized the authorities in southeast Turkey for corruption and
failure to adequately protect their citizens. 4' The court found a
violation of Article 2 (right to life) and a violation of Article 13
(right to an effective remedy) and awarded £15,000 in nonpecuniary damages in respect of Kemal Kilic and £2,500 to the
applicant himself, Kemal's brother.45 It also awarded £20,000 for
legal costs and expenses.46
It is important to note that in these cases the Turkish
government blamed the deaths on the PKK, giving jurisdiction to
the State Security Courts (SSC), which are responsible for crimes
of terrorism. 47 The SSCs have received a great amount of
criticism for three reasons. First, participation of military judges
in the SSCs removes the independent judicial review necessary for
an effective judicial system. Second, there are fewer protections
for defendants in the SSCs than there are in ordinary courts. For
example, prisoners are detained without council for long periods
of time. Last, there are numerous accusations of harassment of
lawyers in these courts.4a Additionally, much of the torture that
allegedly takes place in Turkish prisons occurs while prisoners are
awaiting trial in an SSC. 49 "The removal of political cases from
courts of general jurisdiction to the SSCs has led to an institutional
bias within the SSCs in favor of security at the expense of
individual liberty."5 ° The fact that the military controls these
41 Kilic v. Turkey, 2000-1I Eur. Ct. H.R. 119.
42 Id.
43 Id.

44 See id. at 120-23.
45 Id. at 123.
46 Id.

47 Justice on Trial, supra note 5, at 2130 n.1 ("[Southeastern Turkey] has been the
scene of armed conflict since 1984. The conflict has been characterized by serious
human rights violations including attacks on civilians by both security forces and
members of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK).").
48 Id. at 2131.
49 Id.

50 Id. at 2142.
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judicial proceedings creates a great mistrust in the process. 1 The
European Court of Human Rights has seen this control as unfair to
the defendants,52 and many European countries have focused on
Turkey's military control of various parts of the government as a
cause for concern in regards to its admission to the EU.53 If
Turkey wants to promote itself as a democracy with a fair judicial
system, changes must be made to the system of State Security
Courts and their rigid military control.
B. Tanrikulu v. Turkey
Another example of alleged torture by security forces in
southeast Turkey was the European Court of Human Rights' case
of Tanrikulu v. Turkey.54 In this case, the applicant claimed that
her husband, a doctor working for the government, was gunned
down while the police did nothing to catch the perpetrators. 55
Prior to the killing, Dr. Tanrikulu had been questioned by police
about aiding members of the PKK.5 6 The Government suggested
that the PKK might have been responsible for the killing because
they targeted government officials, and Dr. Tanrikulu worked for
the government.57
Once again, the court found that the
government had violated the Convention by failing to conduct a
proper investigation into the death of Dr. Tanrikulu (Articles 2 and
13), and the court awarded the applicant £15,000 for nonpecuniary damages and £15,000, less 13,495 French francs, for
costs and expenses. 8

51 See id. ("The international community generally disapproves of courts in which
military judges exercise jurisdiction over civilians because the independence of such
courts cannot be guaranteed.").
52 Id. at 2145 ("Both the [European] Commission and the Court have found the
presence of a military judge on SSC panels violates a defendant's right to an independent
and impartial tribunal.").
53 Id. at 2146.

56

Tanrikulu v. Turkey, 1999-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 145.
Id. at 145-46.
Kaya v. Turkey, 2000-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 125, 127.

57

Id.

58

Tanrikulu, 1999-X Eur. Ct. H.R. at 148-50.

54
55
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C. Yasa v. Turkey
The case of Yasa v. Turkey brought another allegation of
corruption against the Turkish government. 9 In this case, the
applicant claims that government officials were responsible for
burning down his kiosk, severely assaulting the applicant and
killing his uncle, because they sold a Kurdish newspaper at the
kiosk.6" The government denied any involvement in the burning
of the kiosk or the killing of the applicant's uncle.6 This case was
significant because the Susurluk report was used for the first time.
Though the report was initially created for the Prime Minister's
benefit, it had now been made available to the public and used as
documentation of governmental responsibility for harsh treatment
of Turkish citizens.62 In Yasa, the court once again found that
there had not been an adequate investigation into the death of the
applicant's uncle and awarded damages accordingly.63 The court
has repeatedly refused to hold the government directly responsible
for causing the deaths in these cases, but implies responsibility by
holding that prisoners are tortured and that cases are not properly
investigated.64 These cases further the assumption by the European
countries that the Turkish government does not place a high
enough value on human rights issues.
D. Aksoy v. Turkey
In another case before the European Court of Human Rights,
Aksoy v. Turkey, there was an allegation that the Turkish
government had tortured, by way of a "Palestinian hanging," and
killed a member of the PKK.65 The case came to the European
Court of Human Rights from the government of Turkey requesting
a decision as to whether the government had breached its
obligations under Articles 3, 5-3, 6-1, and 13.66 The case was

59 See generally Yasa v. Turkey, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. 408 (1998).
60 Id.
61 Id. at 417.
62 Id. at 420.
63 Id. at 455.
64 See id.

65 Aksoy v. Turkey, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 553 (1997).
66 Id. at 557.
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pursued by Aksoy's father.67 Aksoy was accused of being a PKK
terrorist and was taken from his home and confined to a cell.68
Aksoy claimed that while he was detained, he was hung,
electrocuted, and beaten repeatedly. 69 The government denied
torturing him, and the prosecutor later decided not to institute
criminal proceedings on behalf of Aksoy.7 °
The applicant,
Aksoy's father, claimed that Aksoy was subsequently killed
because he made an application to the Commission complaining
about this torture. The government alleged, however, that Aksoy's
death was the result of fighting among PKK factions.7 Turkey
also stated that its government officials had some leniency in the
enforcement of the laws in the southeast region, because it was in
a state of emergency due to threats to national security.72 The
government admitted that it may infringe somewhat upon
individual rights in that region, but the intrusions are necessary in
order to gather information to protect "the life of the nation."73
Considering the fact that the southeast region is the area of
Turkey most notorious for torture and human rights violations, the
argument of "state of emergency" in that area is perhaps Turkey's
best effort to justify its actions to the Europeans.74 This court, as
well as the members of the EU, recognizes that there is a serious
conflict in that part of Turkey;75 however, it is not sufficient to
justify a complete disregard for the rights of some individuals.
The severity of the allegations in this case and many others
warrant consideration of what exactly is necessary to protect the
citizens of that region.
The facts of Aksoy v. Turkey were submitted to the European
Commission of Human Rights, which found a violation of Article
3, Article 5-3, and Article 6-1, but found no separate issue under

67 Id. at

559.

68

Id.

69

Id. at 560.

70

Id. at 561.

71 Id. at 575.
72

Id. at 572.

Id. at 555.
74 See Justice on Trial, supra note 5, at 2130-34.
75 Aksoy, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 572.
73
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Article 13.76 The Commission is primarily responsible for
findings of fact, and "while the Court is not bound by the
Commission's findings of fact and remains free to make its own
appreciation in the light of all the material before it, it is only in
exceptional circumstances that it will exercise its powers in this
area." 77 The government's claim to the court was that the
applicant had not exhausted all domestic remedies as required by
Article 26. 71 "The machinery of protection established by the
Convention is subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding
human rights., 79 The applicant, however, replied that because of
the emergency rule of that region, the normal proceedings would
not provide him with an effective remedy.8" The court agreed with
the findings of the Commission that the applicant had exhausted
domestic remedies because he was suffering from a clearly visible
ailment at the time of his meeting with the prosecutor. The
prosecutor still decided not to pursue his allegation against the
government.8" "The Court noted that '[t]here is no obligation to
have recourse to remedies which are inadequate or ineffective.'",2
In other words, the court found that the situation was so bad in
southeast Turkey that they had to intervene to protect the interests
of the applicant.83 The determination of the European Court of
Human Rights that a country's internal controls are inadequate is
somewhat intrusive, but it is the established purpose of the court to
intervene to protect individual rights when their country fails to
protect them.84
The court was unable to find any evidence that Aksoy's death
was the result of treatment by government officials, despite the
fact that the circumstances surrounding the murder were highly
suspicious.85 The court, however, did find a violation of Article 3,
76

Id. at 573-74.

77

Id. at 578.
Id. at 554.

78

79 Id. at 582.
80 Id.
81

Id. at 578.

82

See Justice on Trial, supra note 5, at 2175.

83

See id.

84

See Aksoy, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 582.

85

Id. at 553.
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which prohibits torture or inhuman or degrading treatment.86 The
court stated that if someone is in good health prior to detention and
has ailments upon release, the burden is on the state to prove that
there is an explanation, aside from torture, for the injuries. 87 The
court also found that there had been a violation of Article 5-3, the
right of arrested persons to be brought before a judge, because it
''was not persuaded that the exigencies of the situation
necessitated the holding of the applicant on suspicion of
involvement in terrorist offences for fourteen days or more in
incommunicado detention without access to a judge or other
judicial officer."88
Article 6-1 (the right to a fair and public hearing) and Article
13 (the guarantee of a domestic remedy for Convention decisions)
of the Convention on Human Rights were considered to be parts of
a similar issue, in which the Government of Turkey violated the
applicant's rights by failing to investigate his claim. 89 The court
awarded the applicant 4.2 billion Turkish liras as compensation for
damages, as well as the costs and expenses of the litigation.9 ° This
case was an example of the inaccessibility of the Turkish judicial
system for ethnic minorities. Equality among citizens must be an
immediate goal for reform in Turkey.
IV. Significance of the Case
A. Problems with GovernmentalAccountability
These findings of the European Court of Human Rights
demonstrate that there is a legitimate reason for denying Turkey's
admission to the EU. The corrupt governmental policy and refusal
to protect the rights of all of its citizens are exactly the types of
actions that continue to draw criticism from the European Union.9'
As was the case in Aksoy, the EU is concerned that many people in
Turkey are denied the right to a fair trial.92 State Security Courts
86

Id. at 597.

87

Id. at 585.

88

Id. at 590.

89

Id. at 591.

90 Id.at 596-97.
91 See European Union OKs 1O for Membership, supranote 1.
92

Justice on Trial, supra note 5, at 2131.

2004]

TIMES OF CHANGE

are known to deny access to legal counsel during the pre-trial
interrogation. 93 Also, members of security forces "responsible for
capturing and detaining suspects" are not accountable for
involvement in violations of human rights because Turkish law
prevents police from being prosecuted "without the permission of
administrative authorities. '94 These customs in Turkish law
promote the corruption and lack of accountability of officers of the
government that has caused such concern from EU member
states.95 The European Court of Human Rights found that the
National Security Courts do not meet the requirement of
independence imposed by Article 6 of the Convention because of
the presence of a military judge. 96 The principle of fairness of
judicial procedure typical in Western societies seems to be lacking
in Turkey.
B. Other Human Rights Violations
Another human rights issue in Turkey receiving plenty of
attention is the lack of fairness toward women in the country.9 7
Many writers consider women's rights reform and torture as the
country's two greatest human rights disasters.98 In Turkey, women
have traditionally been treated as unequal to men, which is not a
standard recognized in the EU.99 The role that women have
traditionally been expected to hold is demonstrated by the former
use of "virginity tests."' 0 Girls, some as young as fourteen, were
given forced gynecological examinations if suspected of having
pre-marital sex.'
Also, the male traditionally has been the head
of the household and has been responsible for all major decisions,

93
94

Id. at 2131-33.
Id. at 2149, 2177.
id.
See Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 28-29 (1999).

95 See
96

See Mona Eltahawy, Turkish Law Recognizes Women, Men as Equals, WOMEN'S
(Jan. 13, 2002), at http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfn/dyn/aid/777/
context/archive.
98 See id.
97

ENEWS

99 See id.
100 See Turkey Scraps Schoolgirl Virginity Tests, Genesis of Eden (Feb. 28, 2002),

at http://www.dhushara.com/book/upd3/2002b/islamw/turk.htm.
101 Id.
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including whether the woman would work outside the house."°2
Turkey remains somewhat behind the Western world in terms of
recognizing women as equal to men and only recently began
proposing changes to legislation that would guarantee women's
rights. 3 These changes, much like the need to protect the rights
of the Kurds, are an integral step in treating all citizens as equals
in accordance with the standards established in Western European
countries.
C. History of Turkish Law
To understand the current human rights issues and recent
governmental actions in Turkey, it is necessary to examine the
history of the Turkish legal system. Islamic laws governed Turkey
between 1876 and 1925." °4 These laws were based on the Quran,
or word of God, and the Hadith, which was the conduct of the
prophet Muhammed. 05 The old Islamic law permitted polygamy,
repudiation, and the inferior status of women. 1 6 These ancient
traditions are still taught in many Turkish families, thereby
creating an impediment to change.
The modern Turkish state, created in 1923, replaced traditional
religious law with secular law."°7
Turkey established a
constitution as the supreme law of the land and provided for
constitutional courts. 11 8 Codes and statutes were adopted in
Turkey based on the systems of European countries.'0 9 This could
prove beneficial to Turkey's petition for admission to the EU,
because the basis of the legal system is somewhat similar to
member states. In 1926, the Turkish Civil Code was adopted
based on the Swiss Civil Code."0 Turkey derived its Criminal
Code from the Italian Criminal Code, which replaced Turkey's
102 Eltahawy, supra note 97.
103 See id.
104 INTRODUCTION TO TURKISH LAW 2 (Dr. Tugrul Ansay & Don Wallace, Jr. eds.,
Kluwar Law International 1996).
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 9.
108 Id. at 6.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 9.
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Islamic justice system.'
While the Code is similar to that of
European states, the procedure of the Turkish Criminal Code in
modem Turkey
has been a cause for concern to human rights
2
1
activists.
The Criminal Code provides the following types of
punishments: death (until very recently); imprisonment; fines; and
disqualification to hold public office or disqualification from a
profession or trade. 13 With the recent abolition of the death
penalty, the Turkish Criminal Code, as written, forms a basis for
administering criminal justice that would be favorable to the
EU.114 It is the process of implementing that written law that
causes concern. 115 The Turkish Criminal Code does provide
limiting instructions to its enforcement, but there is serious doubt
among citizens and foreigners alike as to how strenuously these
are enforced.' 16 For example, Section 243 of the Criminal Code
provides that if a public officer tortures an accused person in order
to obtain a confession, the offending officer shall be punished by
imprisonment." 7 Despite provisions such as this, as already
shown, there have been widespread accusations that the Turkish
police are not made to comply with the law and that they actively
participate in torture in order to obtain confessions." 8 These
practices are incompatible with the current standards of an
individual's rights in the EU.
D. Goal of Human Rights Reform - EU Admission
Although criticized by many national and international human
rights organizations, Turkey has attempted to improve its human
rights policies - at least partially - in order to gain the approval of

III

THE TURKISH CRIMINAL CODE 1-2 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1965).
112 Justice on Trial, supra note 5, at 2129.
113 THE TURKISH CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 111, at 16.
114 See Death Penalty is Removed from Penal Code, TURKISH PRESS.COM (2002), at
http://www.turkishpress.com/turkishpress/news.asp?ID=6610 (last visited Mar. 26,
2004).

115 See Eltahawy, supra note 97.
116 Justice on Trial, supra note 5, at 2171.
117 THE

TuRKIsH CRIMINAL CODE, supranote 111, at 87.

118 Justice on Trial, supra note 5, at 2171.
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the European Union.11 9 The European Economic Community was
formed after World War II in order to join the European nations
12
economically and provide peace and prosperity in the region. 1
The basis of this organization was a series of economic treaties,
which have subsequently led to the formation of the European
Union. 121 While the EU was originally formed to further
economic trade, it has recently become more of a governing body,
taking an interest in the policies of its member states. 122 The
European Commission is the executive branch, which "proposes
policies and legislation.., and ensures that the provisions of the
Treaties are implemented." 123 "The Council enacts legislation
binding throughout EU territory and directs intergovernmental
cooperation." 12' The Parliament discusses proposed legislation,
and the Court of Justice interprets the law of the EU. 125 It is
through these governing bodies that the EU is able to regulate the
policies of its member126states and thus compel cooperation in areas
such as human rights.
In order to be considered for admission into the EU, an
applicant country must meet certain requirements.127
Each
applicant country must write its position on the acquis.128 Next, a
series of negotiations are conducted to determine the conditions
under which the applicant country will accept the acquis; these
negotiations are followed by ratification. 129 In addition, an
applicant country must meet certain criteria, specifically the
following: a stable democracy; respect for human rights; rule of
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law; protection of minorities within the country; a functioning
market economy; and adherence to the policies of membership in
the EU. 30
In accordance with the European Union's espoused
commitment to the principles of liberty and democracy, the
guarantee of respect for human rights was enumerated during the
EU's formation as a primary concern. 13 1 The European Court of
Justice developed case law on human rights, which was a valuable
tool in guiding EU members
to establish human rights policies at
132
the outset of the EU.
As the European Community, and later the European Union,
continued to progress as a unified organization, human rights
policies were increasingly codified through various treaties.'33 In
1987, the Single European Act (SEA) marked the introduction of
human rights policies into treaties.'3 4 Human rights issues were a
central item in the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty),
rather than a supplement to it, which demonstrated the increased
importance in this area. 35 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union is a guideline for member states as they
implement EU law and contains the following specific provisions:
prohibition of torture or inhuman treatment (Article 4);I36
establishment of equality between men and women to be assured
in all areas (Art. 23); 13' establishment of the right to a fair and
public trial within a reasonable amount of time (Art. 47);138 and a
declaration that the severity of penalties shall not be
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disproportionate to the criminal offence (Art. 49)."39 The
14 °
Amsterdam Treaty "established procedures intended to protect"'
the human rights established by the Maastricht Treaty through
three provisions. First, the treaty empowered the European Union
to ensure respect of fundamental rights and freedoms in the
member countries.'4 1 Second, the treaty defined the grounds for

EU intervention for human rights protection as "discrimination
based on sex, race, or ethnic origin, religion, belief, disability, age
or sexual orientation.' ' 142 Finally, the EU was required, thereafter,
to include a binding human rights clause in treaties with third
party countries.' 4 3 These provisions, implemented throughout the

evolution of the European Union, demonstrate the growing
importance of human rights to this organization and explain the
recent decisions rendered against Turkey by the European Court of
Human Rights.'44
One of the principle tools in the effort to remedy human rights
problems throughout Europe has been the formation of the
European Court of Human Rights. 45 Initially, the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was
established to hear claims of human rights violations and to issue
46
opinions on the validity of the claims against member states.
Due to the dramatic increase in the number of claims brought
before the Convention, the members decided to implement a "fulltime court" to hear the
claims and "strengthen the judicial
' 14
character of the system. 1
The European Court of Human Rights, set up in 1959 but
subsequently modified, was established to hear claims from any
contracting state or individual claiming to be the victim of a
139 Id. at 68.
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violation of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms. 148 It is composed of the number of
judges equal to that of the Contracting States. "[T]he judges sit on
the court in their individual capacity and do not represent any
State.' 49 The court is divided into four sections, balanced
geographically and "takes account for the different legal systems
of the Contracting States."' ° Cases before the court are subject to
an adversarial and public procedure. 5 ' Those cases with merit are
heard by a Chamber, which decides by majority vote. 5 2 After the
decision of the Chamber, a party may request that a Grand
Chamber review the case.'53 Although a relatively new method of
dealing with human rights violations, the court does rely on the
precedent of its former decisions in determining whether there has
been a violation of human rights.'54 The European Court of
Human Rights has proven to be an effective forum for dealing
with these problems, as demonstrated by the dramatic increase in
cases heard - 5,979 in 1998 to 13,858 in 2001.55
E. Turkey's Efforts to Reform
In order to align itself with other EU member states, Turkey
made several policy changes designed to alleviate its own human
rights problems. 5 6 The Turkish Civil Code was amended in order
to provide equal rights to women within the country.'
The new
code grants equal property rights to women in the case of divorce
and has raised the legal age for marriage to over eighteen for both
men and women.58 The husband is no longer automatically the
148
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head of the family, as evidenced by the following provisions:
marriage can take place in either spouse's province; both partners
can represent the family in legal matters; the financial
responsibilities for the family are shared between the husband and
wife; and couples can now jointly decide where to live. 5 9 These
changes provide women in Turkey with many of the basic rights
taken for granted in other parts of the world. When compared
with the members of the EU and other Western countries, these
changes in Turkey were long overdue.' 60
Another legislative change implemented to appease the
member states of the European Union was the formal removal of
the death penalty from the Turkish Criminal Code.' 6 ' Although
executions have been rare in Turkey for some time, this provision
was officially passed by Parliament on August 2, 2002.162 The
163
death penalty has been commuted to a sentence of life in prison.
The death penalty, however, has been maintained for "war and
situations of imminent war,"'" which appears to provide an "out"
for the Turkish government and raises suspicion among EU
members. Given the fact that Turkey has attempted to justify its
treatment of the Kurds in southeast Turkey by declaring a state of
emergency in that region, the government's actions will be closely
scrutinized to see if the exception to the death penalty in times of
war is used on prisoners in southeast Turkey. Considering the
public disapproval of the death penalty that has been displayed by
Europeans toward countries such as the United States, the removal
of this type of penalty from the Criminal Code was necessary for
Turkey to receive serious consideration.
Turkey has attempted to eliminate one of the European
Union's greatest concerns, torture, by passing new legislation
designed to remove the possibility of torture in the criminal
system. 165 Turkey has ratified the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which
159 Turkey Scraps Schoolgirl Virginity Tests, Genesis of Eden, supra note 100.
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provided rights to those accused of crimes.16 6 It established the
right to challenge the lawfulness of one's detention before a court,
habeas corpus, and also granted the right of compensation for
wrongful imprisonment. 167 Turkey has also ratified the United
Nations Convention Against Torture and the European Torture
Convention, which are agreements designed specifically to reduce
the torture of prisoners. 16' These agreements explicitly prohibit
torture during criminal interrogation and require "that any
statement which is established to have been made as a result of
169
torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings."'
The torture of the Kurds and other minorities appears to be the
most severe obstacle to Turkey's admittance into the EU. 17 0 The
ratification of these agreements is a step in the right direction.
However, many feel Turkey must take more affirmative actions to
prevent this behavior. 7 '
Freedom of speech is another area of concern with regard to
the treatment of ethnic minorities in Turkey.'72 Because Turkey's
treatment of ethnic minorities, particularly the Kurds, has been
harshly criticized, the Turkish government recently voted to
permit Kurdish and other minority languages to be taught in
schools.'73 This relatively small step is yet another demonstration
of Turkey's dedication to promote the values embraced by the EU
member states in order to win their approval.'74 Perhaps this
change and others like it will prevent circumstances such as those
that led to the Yasa case from happening in the future.
V. Conclusion
The cases from the European Court of Human Rights have
served as a guide to Turkey in its efforts at reform. In these cases,
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judges from various European countries have found the procedures
used against the Kurds to be unacceptable. The hearings before
the European Court of Human Rights present an arena for Turkey
to prove that it has in fact altered its treatment of minorities, as
opposed to simply making policy changes. This court provides the
only exposure that many Europeans have to Turkish treatment of
human rights issues. When evidence of torture and refusal of the
necessities of the legal process cease to be presented to this court,
the Europeans may be satisfied that Turkey has made actual
changes in conformity with the policies of the EU member states.
Until that time, the passing of anti-torture legislation will seem to
be a mere fagade, designed to expedite Turkey's admission to the
EU.
While the current members of the European Union have
recognized the significant steps that Turkey has made to improve
human rights, the EU has provided further suggestions to help
Turkey reach the level of human rights protection that the EU
desires. Turkey has passed several legislative policies aimed at
correcting human rights violations, but the EU would like to see an
increased effort to reform the judiciary (for example, making it
more independent).' 75
The EU has pushed Turkey to reduce corruption and increase
governmental accountability to the public,'7 6 which was a concern
in each of the cases mentioned. The military continues to be a
dominant force in Turkey, and it must be held accountable to
elected officials.' Turkey must also guarantee freedom of speech
for its people, especially ethnic minorities.' 78 These measures will
further align Turkey with the other countries of Europe as a
democratic nation.
In conclusion, the Turkish government is curious to know if its
human rights reform will be sufficient to gain admission to the
European Union and what the future holds for this secular nation
of Muslim people. Thus far, cases such as Kaya v. Turkey have
proven that there is much improvement to be made before Turkey
is on the same level as other European nations with regard to
175 European Union OKs lOfor Membership, supra note 1.
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human rights. Is there a prejudice in the European Union against
Turkey because its people are Muslim? Will the newly elected
Justice Party, with roots in the Islamic movement, continue the
drive for EU membership or steer the country in another direction?
Will the United States apply economic pressure to the European
Union in order to encourage the admission of Turkey, "which
Washington considers a loyal and strategically important Muslim
ally in the war on terrorism?"' 79 Only time will tell.
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